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ABSTRACT
Background: Clinical risk management focuses on improving the 
quality and safety of  health care services by identifying the circumstances 
and opportunities that put patients at risk of  harm and acting to prevent 
or control those risks. The goal of  this study is to identify and assess 
the failure modes in the ICU of  Qazvin’s Social Security Hospital (Razi 
Hospital) through Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). 
Methods: This was a qualitative-quantitative research by Focus 
Discussion Group (FDG) performed in Qazvin Province, Iran during 
2011. The study population included all individuals and owners who 
are familiar with the process in ICU. Sampling method was purposeful 
and the FDG group members were selected by the researcher. The 
research instrument was standard worksheet that has been used by 
several researchers. Data was analyzed by FMEA technique.
Results: Forty eight clinical errors and failure modes identified, 
results showed that the highest risk probability number (RPN) was 
in respiratory care “Ventilator’s alarm malfunction (no alarm)” 
with the score 288, and the lowest was in gastrointestinal “not 
washing the NG-Tube” with the score 8. 
Conclusions: Many of  the identified errors can be prevented by 
group members. Clinical risk assessment and management is the 
key to delivery of  effective health care.
Keywords: Risk assessment, failure mode and effect analysis, 
Intensive care unit
INTRODUCTION
Intensive care of  critically ill patients in the high-technology 
units those are well equipped units is an essential components 
of  modern care. For the first time, intensive care unit (ICU) 
was used in a polio epidemic in Copenhagen in 1952. Mortality 
rate was declined from 90% to 40% by respiratory care of  polio 
patients, then, the ICU has been developed to the current form 
with modern equipment.[1]
In the ICU, aggressive diagnostic and therapeutic procedures 
are used for critically ill patients. In normal conditions that patients 
who are not experiencing complications during hospitalization, 
mortality rate is more than 25%, while it reaches more than 40% 
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in case of  complications.[1] Therefore, patient safety 
and risk management is very important in the ICU.
Patient safety is one of  the nation’s most 
pressing health care challenges, which are in the 
domain of  clinical risk management; in fact clinical 
risk management is a principal element of  clinical 
governance.[2,3] In other words, besides error 
detection capabilities, establishing effective clinical 
risk management depends on institutionalizing 
the culture of  error reporting based on 
trust.[4,5] Reducing the probability of  clinical risks 
in hospitals is very important to improve: Health 
care quality, having effective hospital staff  and 
patients relationship, patient satisfaction and also 
to limit complaints on medical errors and nursing 
care.[2,3]
Using an acuity tool to assess risk of  death in 
patients admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU) 
has become a standard parameter for research and 
quality improvement studies.[6]
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is 
a very useful technique to identify and reduce 
errors which was first used in 1960 in aerospace 
industry.[2,3] It is a systematic, bottom-up and 
teamwork-based tool which is utilized in defining, 
detecting, preventing, eliminating or controlling 
failures, reasons and effects of  potential errors in 
a service system. Before delivering final services 
to customers, it manages the implementation and 
documentation of  these activities.[7,8]
The most important achievement of  this 
method is detection of  the system’s vulnerable 
elements and critical points,[9] which requires error 
prediction and prevention. The prediction is done 
by well-experienced professionals with enough 
knowledge and experiences about the process or 
service. Therefore, selecting the team, planning and 
full implementation of  FMEA are very important.[10]
The primary application of  this technique in 
health care dates back in 1990, which was related 
to the production and consumption of  drugs and 
prevention of  medical errors in hospitals.[2,3] For the 
first time, The National Center of  Military Affairs 
in U.S introduced health failure mode and effect 
analysis (HFMEA) in 2008.[11] In the same year, 
The Technical Committee of  the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) licensed 
a technical specification for medical laboratories 
suggesting FMEA as a method for prospective 
risk analysis of  high-risk processes.[2,3] The aim 
of  FMEA is to detect and correct failure modes. 
There are two phases in FMEA. The first phase is 
about the detection of  errors and their effects and 
the second is about the analysis of  critical points to 
determine the severity of  each error through risk 
priority number (PRN) ranking.[8] In fact, FMEA 
has five main stages:
• Selection of  the process or the care that should 
be studied
• Formation of  multi-task teams
• Collection and organization of  information 
about process or activities
• Risk analysis and proposed actions
• Follow-up actions and the risk reanalysis[2]
In the last decades, there has been an increasing 
development in intensive care medicine, where the 
goal is to provide the best outcome for critically ill 
patients. Indeed, a worldwide expansion occurred 
in the number of  intensive care units (ICUs). 
Despite the great importance of  critically ill patients 
care in the ICUs and high mortality of  inpatients 
in these units, according to our review, it seems 
that no comprehensive study has been performed 
in the world to determine risk factors and reasons 
for mortality of  inpatients in the ICU.[12] FMEA 
is an effective method to prevent problems. This 
technique is one of  the most meticulous tools of  
measurement, assessment and finally management 
of  the risks. This study is concerned with the 
identifying and assessment of  available risks 
in clinical cares of  the ICU of  Razi Hospital by 
FMEA.
METHODS
This was a qualitative-quantitative research 
by focus discussion group (FDG) performed in 
Qazvin Province, Iran during 2011. The study 
population included process owners and those who 
were completely familiar with the ICU processes. 
Sampling method was purposeful and the FDG 
group members were selected by the researcher. 
Due to the specialized nature of  clinical care in the 
ICU, FDG members consisted of  hospital matron, 
head nurse of  the ICU, and three well-experienced 
nurses selected by the head nurse [Table 1]. First of  
all, printed and electronic documents related to the 
topic research and were reviewed, after that some 
professional consultation were done, and then 
information about current activities of  the ICU in 
www.mui.ac.ir
Asefzadeh, et al.: Clinical risk assessment in intensive care unit
International Journal of Preventive Medicine, Vol 4, No 5, May, 2013594
clinical cares were collected.
We listed all activities related to clinical care 
during two weeks through direct observation and 
then reviewedpatients history, the nursingteam 
views, finally key activities were chosen in respect 
to head nurse’ opinion and FMEA team agreement. 
Throughout the research, team members were 
trained FMEA technique, teamwork principles 
and brainstorming methods by researchers.
Team members were selected based on their skill 
and experiences accordance with the head nurse’s 
opinion. Key activities were defined by FMEA 
team in 10 sessions up to 22 h, and failure modes 
and effects were detected. Then degree of  severity, 
occurrence and detection of  RPN were identified 
through brainstorming [Table 2].
In order to collect data, standard worksheets 
of  failure mode and effects analysis technique 
were used[13] and all the team members reached an 
agreement to comment and score. Although this 
method gives the most accurate number, but it is 
too time-consuming.
At the end of  each session, the researcher revised 
and summarized the whole discussion-faithful to 
the discussion- and calculated RPN for each failure 
mode.
Data analysis consisted of  following steps:
 •  Reviewing opinions of  team members
 •  Summarizing and classifying data through 
coding and refining opinions, and rewriting 
team members’ views in related columns of  
FMEA form
 •  Returning opinions to participants in order to 
reliability of  the findings
 •  Weighting opinions of  the participant in final 
forms
 •  Final decision making about proposed actions
To confirm the validity and reliability of  this 
research, after formatting FDGs and completing 
related checklists by group members, the researcher 
showed the results to group members and they 
confirmed their accuracy.
RESULTS
Firstly, 138 clinical care processes of  ICU are 
identified and they classified in 8 general categories, 
then 23 critical cares of  these were selected by 
group members for risk assessment through the 
study of  care processes, patient’s history and group 
brainstorming. Selected critical cares have high 
risk score and team members believed them to be 
of  higher sensitivity. They also suggested that these 
cares had a higher RPN compared to other cares. 
After focused group discussions on each clinical 
care for the ICU patients, 48 failure modes were 
detected. Effects and potential causes, current state 
of  controls, proposed actions, responsible person, 
and the time of  performance were determined by 
team members for each failure mode. Given the 
consensus presented to the team, members were not 
required to complete worksheets individually and 
they were unanimous on a topic at the end of  the 
discussion. Results showed that out of  48 detected 
clinical errors, the highest risk probability number 
was in respiratory care sector “Ventilator’s alarm 
malfunction (no alarm)” with the score 288, and 
the lowest was in gastrointestinal care sector “not 
washing the NG Tube” with the score 8 [Table 3]. 
Ventilator’s alarm malfunction has a high probability 
and severity, and it has a high RPN despite its low 
degree of  discovery of  this failure mode.
As a whole, it was determined that most 
of  potential errors had low discovery number 
showing that the ICU nurses were familiar with 
potential errors of  cares and would discover their 
causes immediately. It is noteworthy, nursing 
failure and neglect is not the only causes of  ICU 
potential errors, there are many factors caused 
errors such as patients’ sensitivity, patient with 
complex conditions and underlying disease, lack 
or malfunction of  equipment, negligence and 
malpractice of  physicians and other personnel, 
lack of  proper training to the nurses, fatigue due 
to sensitivity and high volume of  workload in ICU. 
Team members also proposed some actions to 
control and eliminate each of  detected clinical errors 
which were classified in four general categories:
• Actions related to training and improving of  
clinical cares
Table 1: Members of focus discussion group
Group 
members
Organizational 
position
Work 
experience
Work experience 
in ICU
First hospital’s matron 12 -
Second ICU’s supervisor 13 9
Third ICU’s nurse 12 5
Fourth ICU’s nurse 10 4
Fifth ICU’s nurse 10 6
ICU=Intensive care unit
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• Actions related to shift work scheduling and 
use of  motivational techniques for nurses
• Actions related to hiring experienced, 
enthusiastic and skillful work forces
• Actions related to purchase, maintenance, 
repair and calibration of  medical equipment
Totally, our results showed that actions related 
to training and improving clinical cares and also 
proper shift scheduling to minimize nurses’ fatigue 
are very important factors to reduce potential risks, 
therefore proper planning for these factors will have 
significant effects on clinical risk management and 
improvement of  patient safety.
DISCUSSION
Failure modes and effect analysis method is 
used to assess different consequences and processes 
Table 2: RPN elements
RankSeverity CharacteristicRankprobabilityRisk 
probability
RankDetection
10Dangerous - 
without warning
Gravity is dramatic 
and without 
warning like death
101 in 2 or 
more
Very high the 
risk is inevitable
10There is no control or 
if there is, it cannot 
discover the failure mode
9Dangerous - 
with warning
Gravity is dramatic 
and with warning
91 in 39There is very minor 
probability that failure 
be traced and discovered 
with current controls
8Very highGravity is 
irreversible- inability 
to perform the main 
task- loss of a limb
81 in 8High repetitive 
risks
8There is minor 
probability that failure 
be traced and discovered 
with current controls 
7High Gravity is high 
like body burns 
71 in 207There is very low 
probability that failure 
be traced and discovered 
with current controls
6Average Gravity is high 
but reversible like 
fi rst degree burns 
61 in 80Average 
single risks
6There is low probability 
that failure be traced 
and discovered with 
current controls
5LowGravity is low like 
multiply injury or 
food poisoning
51 in 4005In half the cases it is 
probable that failure be 
traced and discovered 
with current controls
4 Very lowGravity is very 
low but most 
people feel it
41 in 20004It is relatively probable 
that failure be traced 
and discovered with 
current controls
3Minor effectsLeaves minor effects 
like scratches
31 in 15000Low3It is very probable 
that failure be traced 
and discovered with 
current controls
2Very minorHas a very 
minor effects
21 in 1500002It is highly probable 
that failure be traced 
and discovered with 
current controls
1No effectWithout effect11 in 
15000000
Unlikely1Almost certainly failure 
is traced and discovered 
with current controls
RPN=Risk probability number
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in health care.[14] The strengths of  this method 
are multi-task teams, patients’ involvement and 
improved understanding of  the process.[14,15] Faye 
also says that the advantage of  such techniques is 
that they do not blame staff, but seek to create a 
safe and stress-free environment for them through 
finding how errors, especially human ones, occur 
during work processes and assist organizations in 
reducing complaints and improving customers’ 
satisfaction.[16]
Using FMEA technique in ICU, we find out 
clinical errors, their causes and potential effects 
then proposed actions are identified by team 
members and each action is assigned to a person 
to follow-up.
Tofighi’s findings showed that FMEA 
methodology has a high degree of  efficiency 
and effectiveness in detecting and prioritizing 
improvable points of  current triage processes 
in a complicated section such as ED and also in 
predicting effective actions to reduce risks.[5] In 
a study performed in 2007, Naseri stated that 
techniques such as FMEA which can be utilized 
based on teamwork with a proactive approach 
would enhance staff ’s precision, focus on potential 
weaknesses and try to eliminate those.[16] The 
main principle in implementing FMEA is team 
formation teamwork. The combination of  team 
members is an important factor in successful 
implementation of  FMEA. Findings of  Dominici’s 
study in 2006 as “implementation of  HFMEA 
in bariatric surgery” showed the importance of  a 
multidisciplinary team of  different professionals, 
particularly managers involvement for detection 
and classification of  failure modes, in enhancing 
the results of  HFMEA implementation in patient 
care.[16,17] Tilburg’s findings in 2005 about proactive 
assessment of  failure modes in Pediatric Oncology 
section also showed that hospital manager’s support 
for the team has an important role in fulfilling their 
suggestions.[16,18]
The results also showed that the composition 
and diversity of  focus discussions group is very 
important to identify and assess risks in ICU. If  
group members have not team spirit, it has not any 
consequences.
Apkon conducted FMEA of  the process of  
continuous drug infusion delivery in a pediatric 
ICU attempt to redesign the intravenous (IV) 
delivery process and to improve patient safety and 
efficiency in staff  work flow.[14,19]
Weaknesses include the time necessary to 
complete a PRA Wetterneck for example, reported 
that the FMEA of  an adult inpatient medication 
system required more than 46 h of  meetings for 
nearly five months. FMEA have also been criticized 
because of  the tedious process involved in and 
difficulty of  the analysis, problems with the scoring 
system,[20,21] and unreliability of  scoring.[14,22]
This study also confirms that, despite support 
from senior managers to implement this technique 
and group members collaboration, this technique 
was very time consuming so recognizing the 45 
failure modes require the five meeting (in  22 h) for 
3 months.
On the other hand, risk number is an important 
criterion in determining the most substantial clinical 
errors in the system. Therefore, the use of  more 
accurate methods with higher sensitivity to the 
degree of  severity leads to better results in FMEA 
Table.[7] In this regard, Sankar also has indicated 
that failure modes with high RPNs have a higher 
Table 3: The highest priorities of detected potential errors of the ICU nursing cares
RPNSeverityProbabilityDetectabilityTitleRank
288984Ventilator’s alarm malfunction (no alarm)1
224874DVT formation2
210675Low position of the bed while gavages feeding3
192864Bedsores4
144982Patient falls from the bed5
108663Absence of routine disinfectants in washing hands6
108943Differences in device settings and doctor’s order 7
108962Failure to identify the type of alarm by the nurse8
108692Absence of washing the suction by head nurse 9
96682Failure to perform proper hand washing procedures10
ICU=Intensive care unit, RPN=Risk probability number, DVT=Deep Venous (Vein) Thrombosis
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priority and are of  greater importance.[23] But it is 
important to note that during the implementation 
of  FMEA in health section, the overemphasis on 
RPN would lead to the ignorance of  errors with 
low RPN and high severity, or with high probability 
and/or low discoverability.
Results show that many of  the causes of  these 
failure modes, not only caused by negligence 
of  nurses and nursing care but also other factors 
involved. For example, the patient’s sensitivity in 
the ICU, complex situation and the underlying 
disease, lack of  proper equipment or equipment 
failure, medical negligence and malpractice of  
doctors and other personnel, lack of  proper training 
to ICU’s nurses and fatigue due to the sensitivity 
and high workload in this ward can be mentioned 
in this section.
According to Reason`s opinion, despite 
overt errors (especially human errors) which are 
often predicted and corrected hardly, the latent 
conditions that underlie human errors could be 
detected and corrected before any occurrence 
of  traumatic events. The understanding of  this 
process would lead the path of  error detection 
towards proactive rather than retrospective risk 
management.[4,5] Benjamin also believes that 
inadequate written or oral communication is the 
reason for many errors, especially medication 
errors. He states that achievement of  safe operation 
depends on establishing safe systems, and proposes 
the implementation of  FMEA in preventing system 
errors and detecting safe networks (with effective 
communications) in health system.[5,24] Weber in his 
study in 2006 also emphasizes that FMEA provides 
a proactive mechanism for enhancing processes to 
prevent deviations.[16,25] Due to the wide range of  
clinical errors in health system, most researchers 
have conducted many case studies.This study is 
intended to examine all nursing care processes, 
and then detect probable errors to manage all risk 
factors. Holding continuous training courses on 
risk assessment and management, enhancement 
of  proper work shift scheduling with motivational 
techniques for nurses, hiring well-experienced and 
enthusiastic work forces, and also maintenance, 
repair and calibration of  medical equipment are 
important actions which could eliminate, reduce 
or control clinical errors to a great extent. On the 
other hand, an efficient management system would 
reduce negative effects of  clinical errors to and lead 
to maximal efficiency of  health care services using 
the minimum possibilities and human powers 
through well-organized activities.[26]
CONCLUSIONS
For several reasons, the intensive care unit (ICU) 
potentially is an attractive setting for early adoption 
of  FMEA; however, successful implementation of  
FMEA in ICUs is likely to require strong, effective 
leadership and a sustained commitment to prevent 
errors that may have occurred rarely or never before 
in the local setting.[27]
Many of  the detected errors can be prevented 
by group members and risk management requires 
the ICU health care processes be controlled more 
to improve the efficiency and quality of  the care.
This technique was implemented based on 
the Hospital’s clinical governance plan. Finally, 
the results were presented to the Qazvin’s deputy 
ofmedcare insocial security organization and was 
appointed this technique also be used for risk 
assessment and management in ED, operating 
room and the CCU.
Suggestions
As highly importance of  clinical governance, 
it is necessary to implement risk management to 
health care quality improvement. For this end, 
it is recommended that using risk assessment 
techniques such as implied here and also by use 
of  FMEA standard worksheet, failure modes of  
clinical care be detected, assessed and proposed 
actions will be taken to reduce their probability, 
severity and detectability. Then, we would see 
improved quality of  nursing cares in hospitals.
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